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Vindicating Science — By Bringing It Down
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Abstract
Science, in the classical view, is the epitome of a rational endeavor, untrammeled 
by social and cultural influences. It strives to reflect the way the world really is, 
and is elevated above our petty human lives. Social explanations come into view 
only when science goes astray — when it stops being science. In recent decades, 
radical sociologists and other science bashers have tried to wrestle away science 
from the upholders of the classical view, bringing it down to the level of other 
human endeavors. Science, they maintain, is social to the bone, and what passes 
for scientific knowledge is nothing but a fabric of social constructions and power 
relations. In turn, this radicalism has fueled suspicions among science advocates 
about any naturalized conception of science: the edifice of science should be free 
from the contamination of social influences. Both parties in the dispute, as we 
argue in this chapter, buy into an intuitive view that characterizes much of our 
everyday reasoning about the causes of belief: a stark opposition between the 
rational and the social. Wherever social influences hold sway, reason takes the 
hindmost. And wherever reason reigns, no need is felt for social explanations. 
This opposition harks back to an even more basic intuition: true and justified 
beliefs don’t require a causal explanation. They are just self-evident. We grapple 
for causal explanations (social or otherwise) only when rationality fails. This 
assumption, handy though it is as a heuristic and first approximation, does not 
survive careful scrutiny, and needs to be abandoned. A rich causal account of 
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science, including the constitutive role of the social, in no way detracts from its 
epistemic credentials. Science, after all, is the concerted effort of many human 
brains. If we want a nonmiraculous explanation of science’s successes, we had 
better be able to account for them in social terms.
What is the role of the social in science? If one consults science textbooks, one 
will find that the social dimension of scientific knowledge is conspicuously 
absent. Science is supposed to reflect the way the world really is, independent 
of our petty human lives. It is, in the classical view, the epitome of a rational 
endeavor, untrammeled by outside influences. Of course, science is carried out by 
human beings, but their individual backgrounds and social lives are simply taken 
to be irrelevant. Individual scientists are effaced from the fruits of their intellec-
tual labors, or relegated to historical footnotes. What matters are the intellectual 
merits of a theory, not who conceived it. What matters is the evidence, not who 
gathered it. This stark contrast between the social and the rational can be found 
in philosophical accounts of science as well. Because social factors are rendered 
invisible in the end products of science, many philosophers have underestimated 
their constructive role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.
In recent decades, sociologists and historians have tried to bring science back 
to earth, but many of them have unwittingly bought into the same simplistic 
opposition. Social influences on science have been relished by its cynical critics 
and resisted by its admirers, and for the same reason: the fear (or hope) that it 
would destroy the credentials of science. In what follows, we discuss the histor-
ical roots of this opposition, culminating in the sorry spectacle of the science 
wars. We also point to a deeper cognitive explanation for this battle over the 
social nature of science: our basic intuition that rationally justified beliefs are not 
in need of any explanation, and that only false and foolish ones are.
Explaining Rational Belief
When do we feel the need to explain why someone believes something? Not all 
beliefs held by our fellow human beings appear to produce an epistemic itch. 
People believe that dolphins are mammals, that the earth orbits the sun, and 
that World War II ended in 1945, but we rarely wonder how they arrived at 
such homely truths. Beliefs such as these are just obvious, and no sane person 
would dispute them. Not only are we not interested in how other people came 
to hold these beliefs, we are also oblivious to how we did so ourselves. Who 
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told you when the World War II ended? Where did you acquire the belief that 
dolphins are mammals, or that the earth goes around the sun? Your sources 
for these convictions, though you surely must have had them, are hard to 
track down.
Psychologists distinguish between episodic memories and semantic mem-
ories (Squire and Zola, “Episodic Memory”). Episodic memories carry a mental 
source tag, containing the time, place, and situation where we acquired them. 
Semantic memories, by contrast, are floating unfettered in our mental space: 
we can no longer retrieve the moment in our lives when we first learned that 
dolphins are mammals, although surely there must have been such a moment. 
Knowledge about biological taxonomy is not innate, and in fact, as in the case of 
dolphins, it is often surprising and counterintuitive.
There are good reasons why our brains don’t bother to keep a source tag 
for semantic memories: doing so would just clog our memory, and be a waste of 
brain resources. Take the belief that coal is black. People may have acquired this 
knowledge in any number of ways: some may have learned about soil deposits 
and compression of organic matter in elementary school, others had first-hand 
experience with the substance as a child, before learning about its origins. Still 
others may have learned about coal from the accounts of parents or friends. None 
of this is consequential for the end result: the culturally shared knowledge of a 
black, solid, combustible material called “coal.”
If we ask you what your reasons are for believing that coal is black, you would 
probably be puzzled. The first answer that comes to mind is: “Why, because it is 
black, of course!” It doesn’t matter how I came to know that. I could have learned 
it in any number of ways. Anyone in doubt about the color of coal can quickly 
retrieve the answer through any number of sources.
Because the truth of such beliefs is obvious, we rarely question how other 
people acquired them, or how they can justify them. It seems as if such beliefs 
just drop out of thin air, without much in the way of a causal history. People have 
many beliefs about the world, or so we think, simply by virtue of these beliefs 
corresponding to the way the world really is. If we are pressed to come up with a 
causal history of such beliefs, we say that people must have been exposed, one way 
or another, to the right kind of evidence or testimony. If such evidence is available 
in abundance, there is no need to worry about the details. In traditional accounts 
of knowledge, the explanation for true belief is pretty straightforward, as Paul 
Boghossian writes: “Under the appropriate circumstances, our exposure to the 
evidence alone is capable of explaining why we believe what we believe” (22).
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Explaining other Beliefs
So how do we account for other kinds of beliefs (as held by others, of course)? 
Beliefs that are false, quirky, idiosyncratic, or plainly irrational produce an epis-
temic itch. We want to explain how people end up embracing them. Confronted 
with someone who believes that coal is red, that ostriches are mammals, that 
cellphones cause cancer, or that Elvis is still alive, we grapple for explanations. 
Who told him such nonsense? Is he the victim of some sort of prank? Did he fall 
for one of those conspiracy theories circulating on the Internet? Some beliefs are 
so blatantly false that we begin to question someone’s sanity, or we assume that 
there must have been some sort of misunderstanding (Davidson).
In terms of accounting for why people believe certain things, we resort to 
special explanations only when something goes wrong. True beliefs that are part 
of common knowledge are taken at face value, but false and foolish beliefs cry out 
for an explanation. Some distorting influence is needed to explain why someone 
has arrived at a belief that no rational person would hold. This is where social and 
cultural explanations come in. We refer to someone’s upbringing or social milieu, 
his allegiances and prejudices, and we invoke concepts such as peer pressure, 
indoctrination, misinformation, or ideological posturing. We say that someone 
is being contrarian, gullible, prejudiced, or trying to save face.
Such explanations, however, are not invoked when we account for true and 
justified beliefs, especially the countless mundane beliefs that all of us share. 
Only when rationality breaks down, it seems, a space is opened up for psychoso-
cial explanations to fill. This association between the irrational (or arational) and 
the social works also in the opposite direction: if X comes up with an explanation 
of Y’s belief in terms of social factors, we assume that X is dismissing Y’s belief, 
or at least not taking it at face value. In folk psychology, rationality is the default 
of belief formation (Dennett; Bortolotti), but reasoning can be contaminated 
by social and psychosocial factors. Wherever the social holds sway, we should be 
suspicious.
This assumption that true beliefs don’t need a causal pedigree, unlike false 
ones, has even dominated much of academic psychology. For a long time psychol-
ogists have investigated deviations from the canons of rationality (Kahneman et 
al.), documenting all the biases and errors that human reason is liable to, but they 
have been much less interested in the cognitive mechanisms of rational belief 




In the classical view, science is (supposed to be) the epitome of reason. It is objec-
tive and impartial. It is ruthless in its indifference to what we fear or fancy. 
When it comes to the content of science, nature has the final say in the matter. 
Social, political, and ideological influences on science are anathema. If they have 
any discernible effect on science, then something must have gone wrong, and 
we are no longer talking about science. As the physicist Steven Weinberg put it: 
“Whatever cultural influences went into the discovery of Maxwell’s Equations 
and other laws of nature have been refined away, like slag from ore” (qtd. in 
Hacking 86). Indeed, the contamination by the social is one of the diagnostic 
criteria to distinguish science from pseudoscience. In many pseudoscientific 
theories, we see that ideological fashions and cultural sensibilities, rather than 
evidence, are the prime movers of theory development (Boudry and Buekens; 
Pigliucci and Boudry).
When writing science textbooks, and for many other purposes, the social 
influences on the development of scientific theories can be safely ignored, just 
like with many of our mundane beliefs about the world. Sure, there is a story to 
be told about how scientists pooled their efforts to acquire this or that piece of 
knowledge, who published it first, who convinced whom, and so on. At some 
point, so we assume, scientists must have been exposed to the relevant evidence. 
But the details of this story make no difference: an alternative history of science 
would ultimately have led to the same result. Not surprisingly, many textbooks of 
science have markedly little interest in the history of the laws and theories being 
discussed, or even in their evidential support. Scientific theories are timeless and 
universal, transcending the particular historical context in which they emerged. 
Especially in the natural sciences, students are simply taught scientific theories 
as if they descended down from some Platonic heaven. The vagaries of scientific 
history, the false starts, wrong turns, and dead ends, the protracted controversies 
between rival views, the forerunners and pioneers of scientific ideas — all of this 
is rendered invisible.
There are of course eminently good reasons for this neglect in scientific text-
books. Once a scientific theory has been firmly established, and its last reputable 
dissenters have died out or given up, the history of its eventual rise and triumph 
becomes a matter for historians and sociologists. There is no need for students 
of physics to linger over the priority dispute between Newton and Leibniz 
about the invention of calculus, or the chronological development of special and 
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general relativity, at least not when it comes to understanding these theories and 
putting them into practice.
For long, philosophers of science have also treated science in splendid iso-
lation from the social world. Philosophy of science, under the influence of 
logical positivism, and in particular Gottlob Frege’s attack on psychologism 
(Friedman), was mainly concerned with the logical structure of scientific theo-
ries, the relationship between theoretical propositions and observations, and the 
procedure or method for accumulating scientific knowledge. The philosopher 
Hans Reichenbach, one of the major proponents of logical positivism, taught us 
to strictly separate the context of discovery from the context of justification. The 
first deals with the historical conception of a scientific hypothesis, or the circum-
stances in which some observation has first been made, and is of little interest 
to philosophers trying to understand the logic of science. Brilliant ideas and 
findings may be arrived at in any number of ways, by anyone, under whatever 
circumstances. No rhyme or reason to be found there.
Philosophers of science, according to Reichenbach’s famous stricture, should 
be solely concerned with how a scientific hypothesis, once it appears on the scene, 
relates to observations, whether it is internally consistent, whether it is falsifiable, 
and so on. The latter issue, which Reichenbach called the context of justification, 
deals exclusively with the logical relation between scientific hypotheses and the 
world, and is unaffected by the context of discovery (Schickore). There is no need 
to belabor the shortcomings of this highly idealized conception of science, as 
those have been amply exposed elsewhere (Creath). Perhaps more important is 
to see that, despite the obvious problems with this exclusive focus on the logic 
of justification, there is a sensible rationale behind the distinction. The ultimate 
goal of science is indeed to cancel out any influence of the social and to retroac-
tively erase its own history: scientific theories have to stand or fall on their own 
merits, independent from their originators.
Down to Earth
In this idealized conception of science, which focuses on the successful end result 
of scientific activity, there is no place for any influence of the social, or indeed, 
for any of the actors involved in the scientific endeavor. All of that is swept 
under the carpet. But the fact that the eventual goal of science is to eliminate 
the social does not imply that social factors have no important role to play in the 
process. Science, after all, is nothing but the concerted effort of (sometimes not 
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so) humble human brains, none of which was designed to unravel the mysteries 
of the world on its own.
In the past couple of decades, science has been brought down to earth again 
by sociologists, cognitive scientists, evolutionary psychologists, and histori-
ans. Unfortunately, the opposition between the rational and the social is still 
besetting the naturalization of science. The backlash against the traditional 
conception of science, epitomized by the logical positivists and their intellectual 
heirs, has swung the pendulum in the opposite direction. Still under the spell of 
the dichotomy between rational and social (Galison), many science naturalizers 
have assumed that, as they bring science down to earth, its pretensions will start 
to unravel.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn famously argued 
that the history of science can be divided into periods of normal science, punc-
tuated by episodes of revolution. During times of normal science, all scientists 
work within a certain paradigm, sharing background knowledge, methodolo-
gies, experimental procedures, and rules of inference. Nobody questions the 
validity of the reigning paradigm. The period of normal science ends when a 
critical level of “anomalies” has accumulated, that is, empirical and conceptual 
problems that the ruling paradigm has trouble dealing with. This crisis even-
tually leads to a revolution and a paradigm shift, after which normal science 
resumes again.
In periods of normal science, uncritical acceptance of the reigning paradigm 
is ensured through social conformity and transferred from the old generation to 
the new. During the revolutionary period, in Kuhn’s picture, the social dynamics 
of science are even more important. This is because the old and the new para-
digm, according to Kuhn, are “incommensurable,” meaning that the choice of 
one paradigm over the other cannot be settled by rational means. It is akin to 
a gestalt switch, where two different conceptual frameworks offer a completely 
different perspective on a given phenomenon.
Many philosophers of science dismissed Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts 
and incommensurability as a form of “mob psychology.” In describing this gestalt 
switch between the old and the new, however, Kuhn opened up a space for social 
influences on science, which some sociologists have enthusiastically exploited 
and, to Kuhn’s own dismay, pushed beyond what he himself thought reasonable. 
In the end, “whether a revolution occurs or the anomalies are simply ignored,” as 
Golinski summarized, the approach of the radical sociologists “would depend 
on the social configuration of the community” (25). Sociologists such as Harry 
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Collins came to the rather surprising conclusion (to most scientists at any rate) 
that “the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of 
scientific knowledge” (3).
There is a continuing debate about the legacy of Kuhn’s work, and the 
correct interpretation of such ambiguous terms as “incommensurability” and 
“paradigm.” In any case, as sociologists were following up on (what they claimed 
to be) Kuhn’s lead, philosophers of science tried to reinstate the distinction 
between the rational and the social, carving out a restricted niche for social 
explanations. The proper place for the social was mainly defined in a negative 
fashion. Imre Lakatos, who was attempting to incorporate Kuhn’s insights into 
the falsificationist philosophy of his mentor Karl Popper, used the notion of 
“research program” as a unit of analysis of the history of science, a less encom-
passing concept than Kuhn’s “paradigms.” According to Lakatos, good science 
proceeds in a rational way, unless or until a scientific research program starts 
to degenerate. When science shows signs of such degeneration, we can no lon-
ger explain what happens in a purely rational fashion, and we must look for 
additional social and psychological accounts. In other words: when rationality 
breaks down, the sociologists are allowed to jump in the fray. Larry Laudan, 
another important philosopher influenced by Kuhn, explicitly defended what 
he called the “arationality assumption”: “The sociology of knowledge may step in 
to explain beliefs if and only if those beliefs cannot be explained in terms of their 
rational merits” (202).
Both the strictures of Lakatos and Laudan, as well as the sociological relativ-
ism that they were battling against (Koertge), rest on the false opposition which 
we outlined above: when it comes to understanding why people believe certain 
things, we only look for psychological and social explanations when something 
goes wrong. From a pragmatic point of view, in other words, the social becomes 
salient only when rationality fails us. The truth of the matter, however, is that all 
beliefs, the true and the false ones alike, have a causal history, involving cogni-
tive and social factors (in varying combinations). If we want to understand how 
people come to believe stuff, even simple and obvious propositions (e.g., dolphins 
are mammals) are in need of an explanation. Likewise, if we want to understand 
how scientists have been able to unearth all sorts of true beliefs about the world, 
we need to understand what kinds of people scientists are, what kind of cognitive 
strategies they bring to bear on their research questions, what the social organiza-
tion of science is, and how hypotheses are tested and evaluated within a scientific 
community (Longino, Science as Social Knowledge; The Social Dimensions of 
Scientific Knowledge).
Vindicating Science 251
Opposing the Rational and the Social
The development of a cognitively and socially rich account of science has been 
delayed by the widespread misconception that such an account would compro-
mise the epistemic standing of science (Haack). Because of our habit of pitting 
social and rational explanations against each other, we assume that the intru-
sion of sociology and psychology into the citadel of science will eat away at its 
foundations. As Philip Kitcher writes: “Much thinking about the growth of sci-
ence is permeated by the thought that once scientists are shown to be motivated 
by various types of social concerns, something epistemically dreadful has been 
established” (305).
Or, as the radical sociologists would have it, something exquisite: this would 
finally bring down science as one worldview among many, with its own power 
structures, social dominance relations, and coalitions (Bloor). If we succeed 
in encroaching on the domain of science, so the sociologists seemed to think, 
surely we are debunking its epistemic pretensions. Why else were the traditional 
guardians of science trying to keep us out? Despite its lofty epistemic ambitions, 
science is shown to be nothing more than a social construction, and can be treated 
accordingly, in just the same way that sociologists treat religion and politics. At 
the heart of this opposition between the social and the rational, according to 
Mercier and Heintz, lies an individualist conception of reason, shared by both 
camps in the science wars: “On the science war front, both camps see reason as 
the ultimate place that is safe from sociological analysis. Defenders of the ratio-
nality of science against relativism could put rationality just there: in scientists’ 
reasoning capacities. Protagonists on the other side of the front have seen in 
reasoning another attempt to resist naturalistic inquiries” (Mercier and Heintz 
515). Mercier and Heintz are defending a deeply social account of human reason, 
according to which its prime function, from an evolutionary point of view, is to 
argue with other people. This, not coincidentally, is also the ecological setting in 
which human reason is most successful. Mercier and Heintz’s view goes against 
the traditional concept of reason, in which others are seen as potential confound-
ers or distorters, and human reason is regarded as a cognitive faculty that works 
best in isolation, free from external influences.
This idea of the social as a contaminant of the rational, to which even social 
constructivists seem to subscribe, is more indebted to logical positivism than the 
latter would like to admit. Radical sociologists were led astray by the very same 
intuition that made the logical positivists allergic to social explanations — only 
now they were welcoming the opposite conclusion. David Hull expressed their 
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line of reasoning as follows: “Because science did not possess the ideal charac-
teristics that the ‘positivists’ insisted that it should, knowledge-claims made by 
scientists had no more warrant than those of magicians, faith healers, and poli-
ticians” (Hull xi).
It is not surprising that such iconoclasm has further entrenched the con-
viction that sociologists should get their dirty hands off the edifice of science. 
If the content of scientific theories were determined by social factors, by ideo-
logical fashions, or by the psychological quirks of scientists, how do we explain 
the impressive technological prowess of science? Science is a way of finding out 
objective truths about the universe. We don’t need sociologists to explain the 
triumph of the germ theory of disease. Microscopic organisms really make us ill, 
social constructivism be damned.
Naturalizing Science
In our view, both camps are wrong (although, arguably, the relativist science 
bashers more so). The simple opposition between the rational and the social-psy-
chological explanations goes against the grain of naturalism. Scientific knowledge 
does not drop out of thin air: it is embodied in real human beings. If our best 
scientific theories in some way reflect the world out there, this must have come 
about through the usual perceptual capacities and cognitive operations, with 
available technological equipment, and in a complex network of social interac-
tions. How else could it have come about?
Science itself, after all, tells us that the human brain is a product of evolution 
by natural selection, and science the product of cultural evolution (Heintz, this 
volume). Humans did not evolve to unravel the structure of the cosmos. Indeed, 
evolution has equipped us with a host of biases and intuitions that served our 
ancestors well in the environment in which they had to survive and reproduce, 
but that often get in the way of our modern quest to uncover the nature of the 
universe (Blancke, Tanghe, and Braeckman, this volume). If humans succeed in 
overcoming these intuitions regardless, developing scientific theories that vio-
late their intuitive worldview at every turn, then we need some nonmiraculous, 
bottom-up, naturalistic account of this achievement. The sociologists are right 
that science is a deeply social endeavor, and that all scientific knowledge is in this 
sense “socially constructed.” No single individual marooned on a desert island, 
no matter how brilliant, would be capable of finding out any of the significant 
truths about the universe that we currently possess. Though the history of sci-
ence has known some solitary geniuses, working in relative isolation from their 
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peers, even they were still engaged in a collective enterprise, in the sense that they 
were building on the work of numerous predecessors. Isaac Newton was stand-
ing on the shoulders of giants (and it’s giants and lesser giants all the way down). 
If we want to understand anything at all about the accomplishments of science, 
we need to solicit the help of sociologists.
The realization that science is a deeply social enterprise, and that scientific 
consensus is reached through coalition forming and competition, should not 
surprise us. The question is what particular social organization is exemplified 
by science, and whether this is conducive to its epistemic aspirations. Scientists 
are human beings, warts and all. If scientists collectively succeed in finding 
out significant truths about the universe, while other endeavors have failed in 
this regard, this must have come about through the particular social dynamics 
of science.
Luckily, this research is now well underway. The discipline of social 
episte mology is investigating the particular social arrangements that are suc-
cessful in producing knowledge (Goldman). Philip Kitcher, in his seminal The 
Advancement of Science, has developed a model of the microstructure of scientific 
change, paying attention to the division of cognitive labor and the social organi-
zation of science. Ronald Giere has investigated the phenomenon of “distributed 
cognition” in science (“Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition”). Hugo 
Mercier and Christophe Heintz have described scientific reasoning as inherently 
social and argumentative (“Scientists’ Argumentative Reasoning”). To dissolve 
the opposition between the rational and the social, let us briefly consider some 
social influences on science, which, though initially seeming to threaten its epis-
temic ambitions, are actually enlisted in the interest of scientific progress.
Positive Roles for the Social
Many scientists believe that being objective and impartial are the cardinal virtues 
of science, and that bias and prejudice make one unsuitable for scientific work. 
Although the culture of science rightly encourages these virtues, they are by no 
means necessary for the success of science. Indeed, a certain modicum of bias in 
this or that direction may actually facilitate the progress of science.
It is not a problem that an individual scientist is biased, or emotionally 
attached to a particular hypothesis. The social organization of science makes sure 
that these biases will be balanced by others tilting in different directions. Helen 
Longino, for example, has put forth an account of the importance of epistemic 
diversity in the workings of science, arguing that (near) objectivity in scientific 
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endeavors emerges from two sources: on the one hand, science constantly con-
fronts itself with the reality of the world, as assessed by our best empirical 
methods (Science as Social Knowledge). This leaves comparatively little room for 
(reasonable) alternative views: it is a matter of fact whether light is bent by grav-
itational fields, as the general theory of relativity predicts. On the other hand, 
the more cultural, gender, and ideological diversity there is within the scientific 
community itself, the more likely it is that culture-, gender-, or ideology-specific 
biases will be corrected. A standard example of this is the reorientation of aspects 
of medical research as a result of feminist epistemological critiques: it is now 
increasingly acknowledged that, for example, we cannot conduct drug tests solely 
on a population of (mostly white, middle aged) men and simply assume that the 
results can be extrapolated to other human biological populations (Gesensway).
In general terms, a good social arrangement for finding out the truth of some 
matter is to have two or more competing groups pursue different hypotheses, try-
ing their utmost to garner evidence for their own view and to prove competitors 
wrong. As David Hull writes, with regard to the ideal of objectivity in science: 
“The objectivity that matters so much in science is not primarily a characteristic 
of individual scientists but of scientific communities. Scientists rarely refute their 
own pet hypotheses, especially after they have appeared in print, but that is all 
right. Their fellow scientists will be happy to expose these hypotheses to severe 
testing” (3–4). In other words, it is best to let a thousand flowers bloom in sci-
ence. Even if you think some hypothesis is unlikely and far-fetched, it might still 
be worthwhile for some scientist to pursue it. The reward structure of science 
ensures that even implausible hypotheses will be explored by someone: there is 
a high premium on being able to show that a certain orthodox or received view 
is wrong. The chances of succeeding are dim, but then again, the reward is huge. 
This social arrangement attenuates the risk that science, as a whole, misses out on 
an apparently unlikely alternative that might be borne out after all.
Many controversies in science can be viewed as a battle between the opposing 
biases of conservatism and rebelliousness. According to Philip Kitcher, cognitive 
variation among scientists on this dimension is conducive to progress in the long 
run (The Advancement of Science). Some scientists are mavericks, quick to chal-
lenge established views and pursue new avenues, while others are traditionalists, 
suspicious of radical ideas and inclined to defend the orthodoxy as long as possi-
ble. There is no single strategy that is always successful: the mavericks take more 
risks and will often turn out to be wrong, but may sometimes strike gold and thus 
prevent the ossification of scientific orthodoxy. Traditionalists are often right in 
sticking with the old ways, and are not the ones to waste time and effort on wild 
and improbable ideas. But sometimes they will be proven wrong too. There is no 
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single ideal way to strike a balance between caution and innovation, between 
persistence and flexibility. A social arrangement that allows for different cogni-
tive strategies to flourish, according to Kitcher, will produce better results than 
one that attempts to enforce one single “rational” policy.
A desire for fame and success is often viewed as unworthy of a real scientist. 
The goal of science is truth for its own sake. Although such base motives may 
indeed compromise one’s scientific work, if allowed to be unchecked, there is no 
convincing reason why they would stand in the way of significant discoveries. 
Even spite, jealousy, and the desire to humiliate a rival can result in excellent scien-
tific work, if the competing parties know that they have to abide by certain rules, 
and will be called out whenever they violate them. In any case, a desire for fame 
and success does not compromise the collective goals of truth and objectivity. 
Institutional arrangements provide selfish motives for honesty and truthfulness 
in reporting and sharing results with others (Campbell; Goldman; Haack).
Indeed, social competition may be more effective as an incentive to do sci-
ence than the pure and noble goal of discovery, especially when it comes to the 
laborious and repetitious work that science often demands. As Susan Haack puts 
it, competition is “an aid to our limited energy and fragile intellectual integ-
rity” (108). Scooping a rival may be more thrilling than laying another brick in 
the edifice of knowledge, but that’s no problem, as both may be accomplished 
at the same time. Fraud is ruthlessly punished in the world of science, not just 
because it undermines the relationship of trust on which science is based, but 
also because it is an unfair shortcut to the success and professional achievement 
that many scientists are striving for. What goes for individual rivalry also applies 
to competition between research groups, as David Hull writes: “As unseemly as 
factionalism in science may be, it does serve a positive function. It enlists baser 
human motives for higher causes” (349).
In all these cases, social influences are not an impediment to the epistemic 
ambition of science, but rather a facilitator of scientific progress. Science harnesses 
some of the baser motives of human behavior in the service of truth, making sure 
that the interplay of scientists’ individual interests and biases mostly align with 
epistemic progress. Social constructivists are right that, in the battle between 
competing paradigms (or research programs), the social configuration of the 
research community plays an important role. This is especially true in the early 
stages of scientific research, when evidence is still ambiguous and incomplete, 
conceptual problems abound, and social factors are given free rein. Even the final 
vindication of the correct scientific theory, however, is also accomplished through 
social means: forming alliances, maintaining a good reputation, showing courage 
to challenge received views, and exercising restraint in attacking rivals.
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Charles Darwin may have been right from the start about the fact of com-
mon ancestry, but his theory would not have carried the day as swiftly as it did 
without Darwin’s indefatigable efforts to enlist allies to the cause and to engage 
and negotiate with his critics. All the parties in the dispute were trying to enlist 
nature as their ally, but Darwin of course had one big advantage: nature really 
was on his side all along. In the long run, therefore, as evidence accumulates and 
factions wax and wane, the social influences on science will be filtered out, and 
rightly so.
Conclusion
The development of a thoroughly naturalistic account of science has been delayed 
by the widespread misconception that this would compromise its epistemic 
standing. Sociological accounts of science have been met with distrust by lovers 
of science, and have been relished by its cynical critics, giving them ammunition 
to undermine science’s lofty pretensions. Beneath the surface, these apparently 
rival views are committed to the same assumption: that social intrusions into 
science would undermine its epistemic ambitions. The only difference is that one 
party welcomed this prospect, while the other loathed it.
But the assumption is false. Science is social to the bone. No single human 
brain would be capable of accomplishing any of science’s successes in isolation 
from others. Science is nothing but the concerted effort of fallible human brains 
to understand nature. As science itself tells us, those biological organs evolved 
for other activities than unraveling the structure of the cosmos. Science contains 
many safeguards against the contamination of social factors (e.g., double blind 
procedures), but in many respects, the social structure of science, along with the 
social relations between its actors, are conducive to its successes. Even the baser 
motives of the human mind — pride, jealousy, revenge — can be enlisted for the 
benefit of science.
It is true that the eventual goal of science, as a collective human endeavor, is 
to efface human actors and their social lives from view. If we ever find out that 
the theoretical content of our best scientific theories reflects the ideology of its 
originators rather that an approximate understanding of the world as it is, or if 
it carried the day for purely sociological reasons, then something would be seri-
ously wrong. That would be a reason to start all over again. Science, then, is the 
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